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The Hilmer reforms introduced competition into electricity generation and retailing, with 
the natural monopoly elements economically regulated and structurally separated. For 
the first decade post reform, these reforms served consumers well. However, three key 
issues emerged from the mid-2000s: (i) a significant and largely unnecessary rise in 
network expenditures; (ii) emissions policy discontinuity; and (iii) more recently, a large 
increase in wholesale prices from the confluence of rising fuel prices and unexpected and 
sudden exits of generators. The consequence was a doubling in retail prices. Also, 
deficiencies in cost recovery mechanisms have meant price increases have 
disproportionately affected low-income customers. We propose three key reforms as 
rectification: (i) integrating emissions reduction and energy policies; (ii) measures to 
boost network capacity utilisation; and (iii) improvements to cost recovery mechanisms. 
Keywords: electricity markets; energy policy; microeconomic reform 
JEL Codes: D04; D20; D31; D40; O13; Q40; Q41; Q42; Q48; Q50; Q58 
1. Introduction 
Prior to the 1990s Hilmer microeconomic reforms, the east-coast Australian electricity industry’s 
functions – generation, transmission and distribution, and retail supply – were vertically-
integrated within government-owned state electricity commissions. Following the reforms, the  
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competitive components (electricity generation and retailing) were separated from those with 
monopoly characteristics (transmission and distribution). 
For most of the post-reform period, these reforms served electricity consumers well, with lower 
prices, improved reliability and increasing product innovation, compared to the pre-1990s 
experience. However, three key problems emerged from the mid-2000s: 
1. A sustained rise in distribution network expenditures. This was due to the combination 
of: overestimated demand forecasts; an excessive tightening in network reliability 
standards; and Global Financial Crisis-induced high regulated rates of return. 
2. A lack of clarity and policy continuity in relation to emissions reduction objectives and 
policy mechanisms; and a lack of integration between energy and emissions reduction 
mechanisms. Gas-fired generation had been viewed as the ‘transitional fuel’ for the 
NEM’s decarbonisation (Nelson et al., 2010). Policy focused instead, however, on 
production subsidies for renewable energy. 
3. The lack of policy continuity, and participants’ exposure to rising, export-parity induced, 
coal and gas prices, increased the costs of existing and new-entrant dispatchable plant. 
Over time this has led to economic pressure on incumbent thermal plant and eventually 
the unexpected and sudden exits of large-scale generators. The combination of these 
events meant the market was unable to respond in a timely fashion to arrest the 
significant wholesale price increases that resulted from the exit of large-scale plant.  
The consequence of these three forces was an approximate doubling in residential electricity 
prices over the past decade. This has been compounded by the regressive nature of residential 
electricity price rises, reflecting inadequacies, inefficiencies and inequities in existing 
redistribution and cost-recovery mechanisms. 
 
 Page 3 
A key objective of the 1990s reforms of the electricity industry was enhancing the productivity 
and efficiency of the industry. Therefore, the trend in electricity prices is used to contextualise 
our discussion of the electricity industry reforms. The focus of this paper is on residential prices 
and potential further reforms to address the negative consequences of the three factors noted 
above. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the origins of reform in the electricity 
industry, while Section 3 discusses the Hilmer reforms of the early 1990s. The post-reform period 
can be divided into two broad eras: 1998-2008, and post-2008, which are discussed in sections 4 
and 5 respectively. Section 6 discusses the regressive nature of recent price increases, and 
Section 7 concludes by discussing the key reforms that are required going forward.  
2. The origins of reform – 1955 to 1993 
Australia’s post-World War II era was marked by rapid economic industrialisation. The 
electricity industry was both a part of, and a contributor to, this industrialisation. The 
industrialisation process did not commence till around a decade after World War II. This was due 
to world-wide and domestic bottlenecks in the expertise required to build and install new 
generating capacity during and immediately following the War. This led to serious power supply 
shortages across Australia, exacerbated by prolonged and severe droughts and coal shortages 
(Brady, 1997). 
However, from the mid-1950s, the amount of installed generation capacity increased ten-fold, 
from around 3 GW in 1955 to 30 GW to the mid-1990s (Figure 1). To date, this has been the most 
rapid growth of capacity the electricity industry has ever seen. The industry expanded through the 
utilisation of centralised generation that produced large volumes of energy transported over long 
distances through an interconnected transmission and distribution system.  
 [insert Figure 1 here] 
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From a pricing perspective, there are two distinct periods worth noting. The first period is the 
1955-1980 period. During this period, real electricity prices fell significantly as economies of 
scale were utilised from the construction of large thermal power stations utilising relatively low-
cost Australian coal and gas. Between 1955 and 1980, real residential electricity prices in NSW 
fell from $375/MWh to $164/MWh, a decline of 56 per cent. Over the same period, residential 
prices in Queensland fell from $350/MWh to $210/MWh, a decline of 43 per cent (Figure 2).1 
The second period evident from Figure 2 starts from the early 1980s. Between 1982 and 1986, 
there were material price increases (around 20 per cent in both NSW and Queensland) from the 
increased investment in capacity by state-owned electricity commissions with costs explicitly 
passed through to consumers.2  
 [insert Figure 2 here] 
These price increases were all the more concerning given the stagflationary outcomes across the 
economy. During the mid-‘80s, annual inflation was around 9-10 per cent. This meant that, in 
nominal terms (i.e. using the cost of living at that time), residential electricity prices rose by 
around 60 per cent, in just a four-year period between 1982 and 1986. 
3. The electricity sector reforms of the 1990s 
The Hilmer reforms sought to allocate the risks of investment in generation and retailing to 
market participants, and away from consumes and taxpayers, as a means to achieving allocative 
efficiency and greater productivity. This provides context for considering our recommendations 
in section 7. 
                                                          
1 Unless otherwise noted, all dollar amounts in this paper are expressed in constant 2018-year Australian dollar prices. 
2 There are also likely to have been subsidies incurred through the use of state government balance sheets.  
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Energy sector reform was driven by the Australian States – starting with Victoria and New South 
Wales (NSW) – rather than by the Commonwealth3. This reflects the fact that energy policy has 
been, and largely remains, the domain of State Governments, since vertically-integrated 
monopoly electricity commissions were developed, owned and operated by State Governments, 
rather than the Commonwealth (Simshauser, 2019). The reforms in each State had the following 
common elements (Chester, 2006; Simshauser, 2019): 
• Electricity commissions were ‘corporatised’ (i.e. commercialised entities incorporated 
under the Australian Corporations Law) and vertically restructured into three business 
segments: generation, transmission, and distribution/retail supply, within existing state 
boundaries. This was followed, after a period of time, with structural separation of retail 
supply from electricity distribution. 
• Each business segment was treated on an arms-length, competitively-neutral basis, which 
reduced the benefit (such as reduced borrowing rates from implicit or explicit 
Government guarantees on funds borrowed) arising from raising capital. This process 
was important in providing a level playing field between State-owned and, as emerged 
over time, the entry of privately-owned electricity businesses. 
• Trials of power markets to demonstrate the feasibility of competition in the generation 
sector. For example, in 1991 the Electricity Commission of NSW – which was 
corporatised, restructured and renamed to Pacific Power – established an internal power 
market (ELEX), and a similar market (VicPool II) was established in Victoria in 1992. 
• Use of ‘vesting’ contracts for the sale of electricity to retailers from generators to 
minimise the risks to generators and consumers in the transition to a competitive market 
                                                          
3  Booth (2000) notes the first attempt at reform was in the mid-1980s by Paul Keating, who at that time was the 
Commonwealth Treasurer. Keating offered to use Commonwealth taxpayer funds to finance increased 
interconnection between NSW and Victoria, an offer subsequently rejected by both of those States. 
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• Gradual unwinding of cross-subsidies between consumer groups (for example, from 
industrial and commercial to residential groups). 
• Establishment of independent regulatory agencies responsible for the economic 
regulation of the sector and in particular the economic regulation of the transmission and 
distribution network businesses. 
The market trials in Victoria and NSW used the England and Wales gross pool as a design 
template.4 These trials provided evidence, and thereby confidence, that Industry Commission 
(1991)’s recommendations could be successfully applied to the electricity industry. These 
experiences also informed and shaped the national microeconomic reform program in the areas of 
market design, network access regimes, industry restructuring, and the development of regulatory 
frameworks. This provided a level of consistency across the jurisdictions – and laid the 
foundation for the transition to the NEM – whilst enabling each jurisdiction to tailor the reform 
program to account for local issues (such as legacy power supply contracts with industrial 
customers and community service obligations). 
There was a staged transition to an inter-jurisdictional east-coast NEM from the trial markets in 
Victoria and NSW. It started with the establishment of live markets in Victoria (VicPool III) and 
NSW (NSW State Electricity Market) in 1993 and 1996, respectively. These two markets were 
joined in 1997 (called ‘NEM1’). South Australia participated as a separate trader in NEM1 and 
then joined the NEM from day one (13 December 1998). Queensland also joined the NEM on day 
one, but operated as a separate regional pool until interconnection with NSW in 2001. Tasmania 
joined the NEM in 2005. 
4. 1998 to 2008 – a decade of success 
                                                          
4  A key difference between the England & Wales design, and the Victorian and NSW market trials, was that the 
former had capacity payments, whereas the latter did not. 
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The NEM formed part of a world-wide electricity industry microeconomic reform experiment, 
which commenced in Chile in 1982 (Pollitt, 2004; Simshauser, 2019). The overall aim of the 
NEM was, and is, to provide a reliable, secure energy supply at the best possible price for 
consumers. This was to be obtained by designing and enabling competitive markets where 
competition was feasible, coupled with robust and resilient regulatory frameworks to complement 
competition (and substitute for it where competition was not efficient).  
By introducing competition, operational and investment decisions would be decentralised away 
from central planners (i.e. governments and regulators) to commercial parties. The NEM was 
founded on the following key economic principles (Chester, 2006; Simshauser, 2019): 
• Appropriate risk allocation: in the NEM, risk allocation and the accountability for 
investment and operational decisions rests by and large with market participants, as it is 
these parties who have the best information, expertise and incentive to manage such risks. 
Prior to the NEM, investment decisions were centrally directed, prices did not reflect 
efficient costs, and risks associated with the (low) efficiency of the sector were therefore 
entirely borne by consumers and taxpayers.  
• Promoting competition 
• Flexibility and resilience of the regulatory and market frameworks: the establishment of 
the NEM was, and is, about allowing market and regulatory frameworks to evolve with 
new technologies and consumer expectations.. 
• A mechanism to reduce production costs 
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Simshauser (2019), p.1 argues that, by virtually every metric, the NEM has been a “resounding 
success” and a “marvel of microeconomic reform”, at least over the period to June 2016. A vast 
oversupply of generation plant was cleared, unit costs plunged, plant availability rates reached 
world class levels, requisite new investment flowed when required, investment risks were borne 
by capital markets rather than captive consumers, and reliability of supply had been maintained, 
with few exceptions, due to a very high market price cap (at A$14,500/MWh for 2018/19), 
amongst the highest in the world. 
The NEM inherited a high-quality and oversupplied stock of monopoly-built utility-scale plant at 
inception. Simshauser (2019) estimates that, at the time of NEM commencement, excess capacity 
was almost 10 per cent, due solely to significant excess supply of high-capacity factor plant 
(around 4100MW, or 20 per cent, of total baseload capacity).5  
This excess supply kept wholesale spot prices generally in a relatively tight range of $40-
$60/MWh (inflation-adjusted) over the 1999-2008 period (Figure 3), though prices spiked in 
2007-2008 due to Australia’s east coast millennial drought.6 Quiescent prices over the 1999-2008 
period also reflected timely new-entrant generation. Plant entry during the early-to-mid 2000s 
more than matched the increase in electricity demand during that period, resulting in wholesale 
prices that were flat or falling during the first half of the 2000s. Between 2000 and 2005, annual 
consumption increased by 12 per cent, yet prices fell by 15 per cent. The sharp run-up in 
wholesale prices from 2016 onward is discussed in Section 5. 
                                                          
5  In contrast, Simshauser (2019) estimates that there was a deficit of almost 20 per cent (around 1,600MW) of peaking 
capacity, compared to the optimal amount of peaking capacity required in the NEM. 
6  In addition to adverse effects on hydro plant, the drought forced some coal-fired generators to mothball units due to 
cooling water shortages, with urban drinking water being prioritised from affected dams (Simshauser, 2019). 
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Similarly, the plant entry during 2007 and 2008 helped limit the drought-induced increases in 
wholesale prices, and countered the price pressures that may have otherwise occurred from the 
(modest) growth in demand. Between 2008 and 2010, annual consumption increased 1 per cent. 
Over the decade to 2009, more than 6,000 MW of gas-fired plant (both intermediate and peaking) 
entered the NEM. More than half of this (totalling almost 3,600 MW) entered in 2008 and 2009 
alone, in response to policy signals7 and the drought-induced price spikes of 2007-2008. This 
investment at-scale, delivered in a timely fashion and in sufficient quantity, also helped keep a lid 
on wholesale prices. 
 [insert Figure 3 here] 
Generally quiescent wholesale prices, coupled with flat network  prices, meant end-consumer 
electricity prices were broadly unchanged; during the decade to end-2008, real residential prices 
rose just 6 per cent (or 0.6 per cent per year) and 8 per cent (or 0.8 per cent per year) in NSW and 
Queensland, respectively (Figure 2). Modest end-consumer electricity prices are one indicator 
that the NEM worked well during the 1998-2008 period. Another indicator is the timely entry of 
new generation plant, especially those plants (i.e. peaking plant) underweight at the time of NEM 
commencement, in response to price signals. 
Flat consumer prices needs to be put in the context of significant drivers for increased prices: one 
of the worst droughts in Australia’s history, combined with steadily increasing demand, and the 
removal of subsidies paid by large electricity customers to residential customers. Competition 
drove lower prices despite the significant upward pressure on costs.8 
 [insert Figure 4 here] 
                                                          
7  These policy signals were the Queensland Gas Scheme (QGS) and the NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme. 
The QGS commenced in January 2005, and required electricity retailers to source 13 percent (later increased to 18%) 
of their Queensland electricity from gas-fired generation. In the first year of the scheme, over 1600 MW of 
generation capacity (across ten gas-fired power stations) was reported to have been accredited (Queensland 
Government, 2007). 
8  Furthermore, the privatisations of previously government-owned entities provided significant relief to government 
finances and budgets, enabling governments to redirect their scarce resources towards other areas, such as education, 
health and transport. This was especially true for government-owned businesses in NSW and Victoria, with concerns 
about the high and rising debts of these businesses prior to their privatisations (NSW Treasury, 1997). 
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5. 2009-2019: three key drivers of the doubling in real prices 
In contrast to the first decade following the NEM’s commencement, prices climbed sharply in the 
second decade. Between July 2008 and July 2014, real residential prices in NSW rose by 96 per 
cent (from $170/MWh to $334/MWh). In Queensland, prices rose by 118 per cent (from 
$174/MWh to $379/MWh) over the same period (Figure 2). Since then, prices have moderated, 
with NSW and Queensland residential prices falling by 2 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively, 
due to a drop in network tariffs. Strikingly, prices in 2018 were at five-decade highs, and on par 
with prices last observed in the late 1950s. The broad consensus amongst a range of energy policy 
institutions and academics is that three principal factors contributed to this increase in electricity 
prices (ACCC 2018; AEMC 2018; Simshauser 2019): 
1. A sustained rise in network expenditures, particularly at the distribution level. Across the 
NEM, real residential prices rose 85 per cent (or $151/MWh) between July 2008 and 
2018 (Figure 5). Of this, the networks component comprised two-fifths (or $60/MWh). 
2. A lack of certainty around emissions reduction targets and trajectories, which, in 
combination with high and rising gas prices, has raised barriers to entry, especially for 
gas-fired plant. Furthermore, the emissions reduction mechanisms that exist – such as the 
Renewable Energy Target and various government schemes – are designed solely for 
zero-emissions technologies. This lack of technology neutrality has precluded cheaper 
forms of emissions abatement, leading to higher wholesale prices as compared to a 
technology-neutral mechanism. Furthermore, production subsidies have not provided an 
economic signal for efficient exit of plant, and have in turn led to disorderly exit of plant 
and raised the cost of the NEM’s transition to a lower-carbon world (Nelson et al., 2017). 
Of the 85 per cent increase in residential prices between 2008 and 2018, environmental 
costs contributed around one-eighth (or $20/MWh). 
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3. Rising wholesale prices, which contributed around three-tenths (or $44/MWh) of the 
85 per cent increase in NEM-wide residential prices. A combination of policy 
discontinuity and rising fuel costs resulted in a lack of entry of new dispatchable plant, 
especially gas-fired plant, despite rising wholesale prices in 2016 and 2017 (Figure 5). 
 [insert Figure 5 here] 
5.1 Increase in network prices 
Between 2006 and 2015, there was a near-tripling in the size of the regulatory asset base (RAB) 
of the combined (transmission and distribution) electricity network businesses in the NEM 
(Simshauser, 2019). The increase in RABs was driven primarily at the distribution network level, 
where RABs increased from $40 billion in 2006 to $70 billion in 2015 (Figure 6). Distribution 
networks’ annual revenues also increased, from $7 billion in 2006 to $12.5 billion in 2015. The 
increase in distribution RABs and revenues was due to a combination of (Simshauser, 2019):  
• An excessive tightening in network reliability and bushfire standards in NSW and 
Queensland, following widespread network outages in parts of those states in 2004 and 
2005, without due regard for consumers’ willingness to pay for marginal increases in 
reliability. While network reliability standards were subsequently loosened, the increases 
in RABs – and accompanying increase in network revenues and prices – were locked in. 
• Overestimated forecasts of peak demand – there was first a slowing in peak demand 
growth in the late 2000s, with demand then plateauing in 2009/10 (Figure 3). Demand 
then steadily declined over the early-to-mid 2010s. Overestimated demand meant 
investments were made, and costs incurred, that are likely to be unnecessary with the 
benefit of hindsight. That said, localised peak demand growth in some areas (due to the 
absence of cost reflective tariffs and air conditioning penetration growth) continued to 
contribute to network costs.  
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• The rollout of mandatory smart meters from 2009 was a major driver of network cost 
increases in Victoria. 
• These large investments occurred during a period of financial market instability (i.e. the 
Global Financial Crisis), which increased financing costs and hence increased regulated 
rates of return to historically high levels. 
 [insert Figure 6 here] 
The increases in RABs across the NEM were not uniform. In particular, the RABs in Queensland, 
NSW and to a lesser extent Tasmania grew at a much greater rate than in South Australia and 
Victoria. Some of this difference has been attributed to the fact that Victorian and South 
Australian network businesses are privately-owned, whereas NSW and Queensland businesses 
were, at that time, state government-owned (Mountain and Littlechild, 2010). 
The increase in distribution networks’ RABs and revenues led to a surge in network prices, from 
$36.8/MWh in 2006 to $68.4/MWh in 2015, an increase of 85 per cent. The increase in network 
prices was compounded by a flattening in electricity consumption, which has meant the network 
price, on a per-MWh basis, has increased at a faster rate than network revenues (Figure 6).9  
5.2 Lack of integration between emissions and energy policies 
                                                          
9  It is worth noting that the network component of the residential tariff in Figure 5 differs from the network amount in 
Figure 6 in two ways. First, the values in Figure 6 relate to the average network cost/price for all customer segments 
(not just residential). Second, the values in Figure 6 are for the distribution network component only, whereas the 
values in Figure 5 are for both transmission and distribution. 
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The emissions reduction mechanisms that currently exist in Australia, such as the Renewable 
Energy Target (RET) and various state government schemes, are production subsidies designed 
solely for zero-emissions technologies. Subsidising certain forms of generation over directly 
pricing the externality of greenhouse gas emissions creates technology non-neutrality. This has 
had two effects. First, alternative and potentially cheaper forms of emissions abatement have been 
precluded, thereby leading to higher wholesale prices than would have been expected to occur 
under a technology-neutral mechanism like an emissions intensity scheme. Emissions abatement 
from reducing the emissions intensity of existing plant has also been precluded. Second, the link 
between financial risk management and the physical needs of the electricity system has been 
broken (Nelson et al, 2019; AEMC, 2016; Simshauser, 2014).  
The incentive under the RET has been to maximise generation output, irrespective of the 
prevailing wholesale electricity price. In contrast, other generators have remained incentivised to 
respond to wholesale prices, due to their reliance on wholesale price signals rather than on 
subsidies. This lack of technology neutrality has occurred at the utility-scale – under the Large-
scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET10) – and at the small-scale, under the Small-scale 
Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES).11  
Subsidies for small-scale generation were enhanced by state government-mandated minimum 
feed-in tariffs (FiTs) for solar PV systems. 
                                                          
10  The renewable energy target was set at 9.5 terawatt hours (TWh) by 2010. In January 2011, a target of 41 TWh by 
2020 was set, but in June 2015 was subsequently revised down to 33 TWh by 2020. This annual amount remains 
unchanged through to 2030, which is when the LRET is scheduled to end (CER, 2018). 
11 The SRES provides a subsidy through to 2030. Unlike the LRET, there is no annual target under the SRES (i.e. it is 
an uncapped scheme) as the SRES is based on maintaining a constant subsidy at or around $40/MWh (CER, 2018). 
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The consequence of the use of these types of policy mechanisms has been to create a disorderly 
transition whereby “firm dispatchable” plant has been rapidly retired prior to new equivalent 
plant being in place. The resulting tightening in the supply-demand balance has put significant 
upward pressure on wholesale prices. Between June 2012 and June 2017, 4,255 MW of coal-fired 
plant exited the NEM (Figure 4). All these plant exited relatively quickly – the weighted-average 
notice period was just 2.9 months, with the highest notice period being 6.9 months for the 540 
MW Northern power station in South Australia (Simshauser, 2019). The large amount of exits, 
combined with notice periods that were far lower than the time needed for new dispatchable plant 
to enter, contributed to spot prices reaching multi-year highs. 
5.3 Higher wholesale prices 
As a consequence of a “disorderly transition” caused by policy discontinuity and reliance on 
production subsidies in the form of renewable electricity certificates (rather than a broad 
economy wide externality price), between January 2016 and December 2018 wholesale spot 
prices more than doubled in NSW, South Australia and Victoria, with Victoria recording a 189 
per cent increase.12 Across these four States, spot prices rose 95 per cent, from $44.8/MWh to 
$87.6/MWh, between 2015/16 and 2017/18 (Figure 3).13 
The increase in wholesale prices contributed to the increase in residential electricity prices 
between 2016 and 2018, more than offsetting the decline in network prices over this period. In 
addition to the unexpected and quick exit of large-scale generators, the increase in wholesale 
prices has also been due to rising coal and gas prices. Between 2015 and 2018, coal prices rose 
74 per cent, from $38/MWh to $66/MWh equivalent, and gas prices rose 115 per cent, from 
$54/MWh to $117/MWh equivalent (
                                                          
12 These price effects reflect the longer-term, dynamic effects of adding more renewables into the system, namely the 
exit of incumbent thermal plant in response to the entry of new generators, and not just the short-term ‘merit-order’ 
price effect. Nelson et al, (2012) note that these dynamic effects have swamped the merit-order effect in the NEM. 
13 The increase in Queensland spot prices (32 per cent) was less, due partly to the effect of the Queensland 
Government’s direction to Stanwell Corporation in June 2017 to “alter its bidding strategies to place downward 
pressure on wholesale prices” (Queensland Government, 2017). 
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Figure 7).  
[insert Figure 7 here] 
6. The regressive nature of price increases 
As a proportion of income, prices have risen the most for the most financially vulnerable. Low-
income households on the median retail tariff spent almost 7 per cent of their income on 
electricity during 2017-18, compared to 4½ per cent in 2013-14. In contrast, medium-income 
households on the same tariff spent 3½ per cent of their income on electricity during 2017-18, 
compared to 1.3 per cent in 2013-14 (Figure 8). The evidence in Figure 8 implies that the increase 
in electricity prices has disproportionately impacted on lower-income groups.14 
The values in Figure 8 assume the same amount of electricity consumption (5,689 KWh p.a.) for 
low- and middle-income households. Low- and medium-income households are also assumed to 
be on the same offer.15 While both assumptions may not always hold in practice, the virtue of 
these assumptions is that potential differences in electricity bills due to consumption differences, 
and/or differences in the average retail tariff each household segment is paying, are controlled for, 
thereby enabling a direct examination of prices paid by household-income segment.  
ACCC (2018) found that electricity consumption is negatively correlated with measures of 
financial vulnerability; that is, more financially vulnerable households tended to have lower 
consumption than less vulnerable households.16 In contrast, Simshauser and Whish-Wilson 
(2017) found consumption to be positively correlated with measures of vulnerability. The 
constant-consumption assumption controls for these inconsistent findings. 
                                                          
14 In the context of modelling the economy-wide impact of a CO2-e emissions reduction mechanism, Meagher et al. 
(2014) argue the impact of this mechanism on electricity prices paid by all electricity consumers – households and 
businesses –  may not be regressive. However, these findings may be sensitive to the formulation of the general 
equilibrium model. 
15  This is the median of all market offers, in those years and regions where retail prices were deregulated, and the 
standing offer in those years and regions where prices were regulated. AER (2018a) details the methodology used. 
16  Annual average consumption of non-vulnerable households (5,709 KWh) was found to be higher than for households 
identified as vulnerable (5,105 KWh). Middle-income households with two dependents (6,540 KWh) and households 
with a mortgage (5,978 KWh) were the two exceptions to this. See Figure 15.3 of ACCC (2018).  
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Based on the evidence in Figure 8, we contend that, ceteris paribus, there are inadequacies and 
deficiencies in existing cost-recovery mechanisms. These mechanisms are: 
• recovery of transmission and distribution network costs, and  
• cost recovery mechanisms for government-mandated subsidies.   
[insert Figure 9 here] 
As noted elsewhere (for example, Sood (2014) and Simshauser & Downer (2016)), the structure 
of existing network tariffs recover more of network costs via the volumetric (i.e. per-kWh) 
component vis-à-vis the other tariff components, in particular, the ‘demand’ charge or per-kW 
component. In contrast, network investment costs are largely fixed and sunk. By setting 
volumetric charges above their efficient levels, thereby setting fixed charges below their efficient 
levels, more of the costs of network provision are allocated to higher-consumption customers and 
to those who are unable to reduce their grid-sourced electricity consumption (Simshauser, 2016).  
This approach is regressive in nature when grid-sourced consumption is negatively correlated 
with income. As home-owners have been the heaviest adopters of rooftop PV, this has reduced 
their grid-sourced consumption, and therefore reduced their contribution to network costs. This 
meant low-income and rental households, who were unable to afford PV systems, had to bear an 
increasing share of network costs (Simshauser, 2016; Simshauser, 2014). 
In relation to government-mandated subsidies, all Australian states have had some form of 
government-mandated FiT, with the largest being the “premium” schemes of $440–$600/MWh in 
NSW and Victoria during the 2010s. The economic value of this roof-top PV output, which 
equates to the value of the forgone grid-sourced power, was estimated to be in the range of $52-
$103/MWh, a fraction of the subsidy received (Nelson et al., 2012). To put this subsidy further 
into context, households at the time were charged about $200/MWh for grid-sourced electricity. 
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To compound matters, cost recovery methods for these FiT schemes were, and in some cases still 
are17, highly regressive in nature, since costs are recovered largely via increasing the volumetric 
component of the network charge. 
7. Beyond 2020 – opportunities for reform 
The broad-based increase in electricity prices since 2009, combined with the regressive nature of 
the price increases, has destabilised virtually the entire electricity sector reform agenda, with 
increasing questions about the desirability of markets and of decentralised decision making for 
electricity (Quiggin, 2017). These questions reflect the combination of: 
• the essential service characteristic of electricity and gas, which means consumers cannot 
‘exit’ energy markets, especially those who cannot afford to go ‘off-grid’,  
• similar issues arising in Great Britain, where it was argued that the increase in electricity 
prices from the mid-to-late 2000s was greater for financially vulnerable households 
compared to less vulnerable households (Littlechild, 2019), and 
• a broader, macroeconomic, concern about the impacts of capitalism, ‘free’ markets, and 
globalisation, on household income and wealth inequality. These concerns have arisen in 
the context of declining real household incomes over the past three decades in the U.S., 
which is attributed to the combination of: greater offshoring and outsourcing of jobs from 
labour market globalisation; regressive tax-and-transfer mechanisms; and reduced 
bargaining power of employees via reduced collective bargaining (Kristal, 2013). 
                                                          
17  While government-mandated FiT schemes are now closed to new applicants, the schemes remain in operation for 
some years yet, running to as late as June 2031 depending on the jurisdiction (ACCC, 2018). 
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While the Hilmer-era reformists recognised the importance of well-designed redistribution 
schemes to facilitate the political and social acceptance, and ultimately the sustainability, of the 
microeconomic reform agenda, arguably more effort should have been devoted to addressing the 
deficiencies in redistribution mechanisms and ensuring the microeconomic reform agenda did not 
lead to increased (perceived or real) income inequality. Similarly, having well-designed 
redistribution schemes is argued to be critical to the political and social acceptance of capitalism 
and private sector-based market economies (Phillips 2017; Kuttner 2018). 
In our view, there are demonstrated benefits from retaining a markets-led approach and 
decentralised decision making. The challenge is maintaining the benefits whilst addressing the 
legitimate concerns about the inadequacy of specific existing policies and mechanisms in the 
electricity sector. 
Since the mid-2010s, various reforms have been introduced to address the drivers behind the run-
up in electricity prices. For example, time-varying (or ‘cost-reflective’) network prices have been 
introduced by some distribution network businesses, thereby reducing the chance of inefficient or 
excessive increases in RABs. Similarly, some of the drivers behind higher wholesale prices, such 
as the sudden and unexpected exit of large-scale plant, have been sought to be curbed via a 
requirement for generators to provide at least three years notice of closure.  
However, four key reforms remain to be done. These are:  
1. Lowering network prices by adopting more dynamic network pricing especially at the 
distribution network level, so that prices reflect the costs of supplying electricity at 
different times of the day. These reforms are targeted at maximising network capacity 
utilisation, thereby lowering prices. 
2. Lowering wholesale prices by integrating emissions reduction policies with energy 
policies. 
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3. Reforms to the ways in which generators access both transmission and distribution 
networks, to enable the entry of new variable renewable energy generation at the lowest 
cost to consumers. These reforms would enable better coordination of investment in 
transmission and renewable generation infrastructure, and reduce the risk of repeating the 
overinvestment, paid by consumers, in distribution networks that occurred during the 
mid-2000s. 
4. Reforms to cost-recovery mechanisms, as well as reforms to redistribution mechanisms 
such as concession schemes, as a means of improving equity outcomes. 
These reforms are particularly important because of two key disruptions now underway: 
1. a change from a small number of large-scale generators to a large number of smaller, 
modular, renewable energy generators, and 
2. millions of homes and businesses that are both electricity consumers and producers 
through increasing uptake of distributed energy resources (DER). The increased DER 
uptake is also facilitating an increasing ‘digitalisation’ of retail energy markets. 
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It is important to note that the rationale for the reforms discussed below is that markets and 
facilitated decentralised decision-making remain the key means by which to promote long-term 
interests of customers (the ‘ends’), where competition is workable and effective. In the instances 
where competition is unworkable, then regulation is the key means for achieving the ends. This 
does not mean that electricity markets should be completely unregulated (or ‘free’); regulation 
can, should, and will play an important role in curbing market power abuse and other market 
failures. Instead, the preceding indicates the ‘preference ranking’ of tools for dealing with 
inefficient outcomes. Where competition is workable, inefficient outcomes should, in the first 
instance, be dealt with by changes to market design. Only where such a ‘tool’ is inappropriate or 
insufficient should regulatory solutions be considered. Conversely, where competition is 
unworkable, developing market-based solutions to address inefficient outcomes would not 
sufficiently deal with the issues – and may well create negative consequences of their own – 
compared to well-designed regulatory solutions. 
7.1 Lowering distribution network prices 
As discussed in section 5.1, overestimated forecasts of peak demand were one of the drivers of 
the sharp increase in network prices. These overestimates, combined with the increasing 
“peakiness” of actual demand, have contributed to a decline in the utilisation of the existing 
network capacity, especially at the distribution level (
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Figure 9).  
Furthermore, capacity utilisation has consistently been lower within the government-owned 
distribution networks than within the privately-owned networks, even though demand is peakier 
in the States with privately-owned networks compared to the States with government-owned 
networks (
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Figure 9). Hence, a key area for reform relates to boosting the utilisation of existing network 
capacity. Improving utilisation rates would mean a greater proportion of overall demand is served 
by existing capacity, lessening the need for demand-induced increases in network capacity, 
resulting in lower prices for all consumers. 
 [insert Figure 9 here] 
Capacity utilisation can be increased by introducing dynamic network prices at the distribution 
network level, which reflect and signal the costs of supplying electricity at different times of the 
day. These price signals reward consumers for being able to shift their usage away from periods 
of network congestion (typically during periods of peak network demand), and into periods of 
lower network congestion. AEMC (2019) provides further more details on this proposed reform. 
A further option for reducing network prices is relieving customers of the cost of financing 
network investments that appear stranded from excessively tight reliability standards and/or 
overestimated demand forecasts. Some argue taxpayers in the relevant States should finance this 
apparent overhang (Simshauser and Akimov, 2019); others argue these assets should be written 
off (ACCC, 2018).18 Either approach could have negative implications for new investment, 
however, by driving up the risk premium and cost of capital for new investments in transmission 
and distribution infrastructure. 
7.2 Integrated energy and climate policy 
The lack of a nationally consistent long-term mechanism to reduce emissions in the electricity 
industry needs to be addressed in a way that links financial incentives to the physical needs of the 
system.19 Investments made to reduce emissions in the electricity industry need to be driven by 
financial incentives to provide energy services at times when consumers and the power system 
need them. Technology non-neutrality has been created by production subsidies such as the RET, 
                                                          
18 A third option for improving network capacity utilisation, and in turn lowering network prices, is the load-shedding 
compensation mechanism proposed by Walker, Falvi and Nelson (2019). This mechanism could make demand 
becomes more price-responsive, thereby limiting the need for additional generation and network investment. 
19  It is worth noting that while the discussion in this section relates to electricity sector-specific emissions reduction 
mechanisms, the preferred approach remains an economy-wide mechanism, as argued in Nelson et al. (2019) 
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which have been designed solely for emissions reductions and subsidise specific forms of 
generation instead of directly pricing the externality. 
Currently investors are unsure about how to calculate their future risks and revenues, particularly 
in relations to emissions. In addition, the profitability of generation technologies varies across 
alternative future emissions reduction scenarios. This is especially true for gas-fired plant and 
other relatively low carbon-emitting plant whose expected returns diminish as emissions 
reduction targets increase (AEMC, 2016).20  
Uncertainty about emissions reduction policies creates barriers to entry for new “dispatchable” 
plant. To overcome this barrier, an emissions policy mechanism is needed that: 
• guides investors on what investments to make such that future costs, risks and revenues 
under alternative future scenarios can be calculated with a higher degree of certainty, and 
is designed to meet the physical needs of the power system through alignment of the 
financial incentives of market participants. Market participants need to remain 
incentivised to positively correlate their output with demand by responding to wholesale 
price signals, rather than just generating at any time of day regardless of whether or not 
the system needs that generation at that time or not, and 
• achieves the emissions reduction targets set by government. 
An emissions trading scheme (either an absolute or an intensity-based scheme) would achieve 
these objectives. Such a mechanism could be used to meet an independently-set emissions 
trajectory at Commonwealth and/or State government level.  
7.3 Enabling generators to finance network investment 
In those parts of Australia covered by the NEM, often the best wind and solar resources are 
located in areas with relatively low amounts of existing transmission network capacity. 
                                                          
20  In contrast, as coal-fired plants have higher emissions intensities, this makes them less economically viable in 
virtually all carbon-constrained scenarios. This makes coal a less uncertain proposition from private investors’ 
perspectives i.e. coal is virtually certain to generate insufficient investor returns in every future state of the world. 
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Furthermore, these locations are typically quite some distance from existing loads and often more 
remotely located than existing thermal generators. As noted in previous sections, the penetration 
of variable renewables has surged since 2017, with almost 4,700 MW of wind and solar PV 
capacity entering the NEM in 2017 and 2018, with a further 2,600 MW expected to enter in 2019 
and 2020 (see Figure 4). This may depress the revenues and profits of existing and new-entrant 
variable renewables in the following three ways: 
1. Correlation-induced impacts. As wind and solar PV generators have entered a region 
(with South Australia having had the highest penetration of variable renewables), they 
have located in areas with the best geography. Over time this has resulted in an increasing 
correlation of output between wind, and between solar PV. This higher “correlation 
penalty” reduces the prices received by these generators (Hirth, 2013).21 
2. Congestion-induced impacts. The correlation between generators has been further 
increased by new-entrants co-locating with incumbents. This increase in coincident 
output has, at times, exceeded the (modest) capacity of the transmission network – as 
noted above – resulting in increasing instances of output being ‘spilled’. 
3. Higher electrical losses (i.e. lower marginal loss factors, MLFs). Those generators that 
locate in areas away from major load centres incur losses associated with the transport of 
electricity to those load centres. For some generators, these losses have increased over 
time due to increasing generator co-location. Between 2018/19 and 2019/20, wind and 
solar PV generators typically experienced the largest decrease in MLFs, of up to 23 per 
cent (AEMO, 2019). This translates into a 23 per cent decrease in generator revenues. 
Dynamic regional pricing is one way of providing an efficient signal to generators in relation to 
the costs of congestion, and in turn the benefits of alleviating that congestion by either: adding to 
network capacity, changing generation patterns, and/or locating in a different part of the network. 
                                                          
21 For example, dispatch-weighted prices received by South Australian wind generators over the year to 30 June 2018 
were around 25 per cent lower than time-weighted prices. 
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By incentivising generators to invest and operate in places with higher levels of existing 
transmission capacity, electricity demand can be met by the lowest-cost mix of generation. Such a 
reform is important to ensure market participants, not electricity customers, bear the risk of new 
investment. This philosophical approach to risk allocation underpinned the original intent of the 
NEM reforms of the 1990s (see section 4). 
7.4 Making price rises less regressive 
Reforms are needed to the recovery of transmission and distribution network costs, as a higher 
percentage of these costs are recovered via volumetric charges than via fixed charges. This 
allocates more the costs of networks to consumers who are unable to reduce their grid-sourced 
electricity. Financially vulnerable households are less able to afford measures such as rooftop PV 
systems and batteries that reduce grid-sourced electricity consumption, meaning they are paying 
an increasing share of network costs.  
Cost recovery mechanisms for government subsidies also require reform. Government subsidies, 
such as those to increase the amount of rooftop PV, have been highly regressive in nature, 
increasing the share of network costs being paid by the more financially vulnerable, as the cost of 
the schemes have been largely recovered via increased distribution network charges. 
Finally, government concession schemes need to be reformed as existing schemes are not well-
targeted to those most in need, and are not harmonised across jurisdictions, causing a lack of 
knowledge about their existence (Simshauser and Nelson, 2014).  
7.5 Concluding remarks 
As we have outlined, the NEM was built around the key economic principles of competition and 
risk allocation. From the late 2000s, governments have strayed from these principles by 
intervening in ways that disempowered consumers and markets – such as through the 
implementation of poorly-designed emissions reduction and cost recovery mechanisms. Given the 
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disruptions underway in the electricity sector, it is more important than ever that the electricity 
sector adheres to the principles underpinning the NEM. Our reform recommendations do this. 
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Figure 1: Installed generation capacity across Australia (1955 – 1997) 
 
Source: Brady (1997). 
Figure 2: Residential electricity prices in NSW and Queensland (1955 – 2018) 
 
Notes: Shaded area indicates period over which the NEM has been in operation. 
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Figure 3: Wholesale spot electricity prices in the NEM (1999 – 2018) 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of AER data. 
Figure 4: Entry and exit of generation capacity in the NEM (1999 – 2018) 
 














































*    Data for the 2018/19 financial year up to end-December 2018.
**   Volume-weighted average of spot prices in the four mainland regions of the NEM (NSW incl. ACT, Queensland, Victoria, and S.A.).
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Figure 5: Drivers of higher residential electricity prices across the NEM (2008 – 2018) 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from ACCC (2018) and St. Vincent de Paul & Alviss Consulting. 
Figure 6: Distribution network revenues, RABs and network prices (2006 – 2017) 
 










































































Allowed revenue (p.a.; LHS)* RAB (LHS)* Network revenue per MWh (RHS)**
*   Data for the distribution networks that comprise the four mainland regions of the NEM (NSW incl. ACT, Queensland, Victoria, and S.A.).
** Allowed network revenue divided by annual electricity consumption, for the four selected mainland regions of the NEM
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Figure 7: Gas prices, coal prices, and NEM-wide electricity prices (2009 – 2018) 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the AER and from indexmundi 
Figure 8: Household expenditure on electricity by household-income segment, NEM-wide 
 


















NEM-average spot price* Gas price (Victoria)** Coal price (Export)***
*     Volume-weighted average of spot prices in the four mainland States (NSW, Queensland, Victoria and South Australia)
**    Prices in Victoria's gas market (imbalance-weighted). Converted to $/MWh based on 11.63 heat rate (for OCGT)
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*   Income shares are volume-weighted average of income shares in the four mainland regions of the NEM (NSW incl. ACT, 
Queensland, Victoria, and S.A.). Assumes constant consumption of 5,689 KWh p.a. and all households are on the same offer
''  Incomes shares calculated assuming household has access to all eligible Government concession schemes and energy rebates.
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Figure 9: Peakiness of demand and distribution network capacity utilisation 
 




































*    Distribution networks in Victoria and South Australia.
**   Distribution networks in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, and Tasmania.
Peak-to-avg demand in 
privately-owned networks (RHS)*
